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This work presents the design, hardware implementation, and performance analysis of novel asynchronous AES (advanced
encryption standard) Key Expander and Round Function, which offer increased side-channel attack (SCA) resistance. These
designs are based on a delay-insensitive (DI) logic paradigm known as null convention logic (NCL), which supports useful
properties for resisting SCAs including dual-rail encoding, clock-free operation, and monotonic transitions. Potential benefits
include reduced and more uniform switching activities and reduced signal-to-noise (SNR) ratio. A novel method to further
augment NCL AES hardware with random voltage scaling technique is also presented for additional security. Thereby, the proposed
components leak significantly less side-channel information than conventional clocked approaches. To quantitatively verify such
improvements, functional verification and WASSO (weighted average simultaneous switching output) analysis have been carried
out on both conventional synchronous approach and the proposed NCL based approach using Mentor Graphics ModelSim and
Xilinx simulation tools. Hardware implementation has been carried out on both designs exploiting a specified side-channel attack
standard evaluation FPGA board, called SASEBO-GII, and the corresponding power waveforms for both designs have been
collected. Along with the results of software simulations, we have analyzed the collected waveforms to validate the claims related
to benefits of the proposed cryptohardware design approach.

1. Introduction
Advanced encryption standard (AES) is the most widely
used symmetric-key algorithm standard in different security
protocols [1]. Originally, the algorithm was called Rijndael;
but after its selection as the candidate for AES due to its
merits, it gained popularity. It is used by hundreds of millions
of users worldwide to protect security in various applications.
AES was conceived as reliable in providing security for data,
until researchers proved that side-channel attacks (SCA) were
successful in compromising its security. Since the discovery
of various efficient SCAs such as power analysis and EM
(electromagnetic) analysis, researchers have started exploring
different approaches to design countermeasures.

Wave dynamic differential logic (WDDL) [2] and sense
amplifier based logic (SABL) [3] are some of the previously
proposed countermeasures of synchronous category. But
both of these approaches suffer from timing related issues
that could leak side-channel information. Wu et al. [4]
proposed an asynchronous S-box design that proved to be
power efficient and side-channel attack resistant. Sui et al.
[5] proposed a design approach that combines S-box design
with random dynamic voltage scaling (RDVS) to boost SCA
resistance to a greater extent.
This paper proposes a scalable asynchronous AES Key
Expander and Round Function designs that incorporate the
merits of null convention logic (NCL) and random voltage
scaling. In this work, these two modules are then utilized to
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design a NCL based subset of the AES cryptosystem. The
reason for calling it a subset is that, in an actual AES, the
two modules are utilized iteratively. But for the cryptosystem
subset discussed in this work, we utilize the two modules only
for a single iteration for verification purposes.
This work has multiple contributions in improving SCA
resistance of cryptohardware as follows:
(1) the proposed approach contributes to a uniform
and reduced switching activity in cryptosystem and
thereby curtail the leaked power and improve resistance against power analysis SCA;
(2) the anticipated improved switching profile also translates to uniform and reduced EM radiation sidechannel information emanating from cryptosystem
and boosts the resistance of cryptosystem against EM
SCA [6];
(3) the proposed Key Expander and Round Function
designs allow easy scaling for implementing entire
AES algorithm of any of the following variants—128,
192, or 256 bits;
(4) they can also be easily scaled and implemented for different modes of AES like electronic codebook (ECB),
cipher feedback (CFB), and cipher block chaining
(CBC) modes;
(5) both proposed designs incorporate a power efficient
NCL combinational substitution box design, which
provides power benefits when compared to the conventional approach;
(6) the proposed design can also be effectively coupled
with STRVDS (spatial temporal random dynamic
voltage scaling) technique to intentionally inject random noise for even higher SCA resistance.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2
gives a background of AES, NCL, and vulnerabilities of
synchronous AES which are essential in understanding the
proposed design techniques. Section 3 details the influence of
switching activity on SCA. Section 4 describes the proposed
NCL AES Key Expander. Section 5 describes the proposed
NCL AES Round Function. The proposed STRDVS noise
injection technique for NCL cryptohardware is discussed in
Section 6. Section 7 discusses the results, which include the
functional verification, WASSO analysis, hardware implementation, and power trace analysis for both conventional
and proposed designs. This is finally followed by conclusion
and future work.

2. Preliminaries and Review
2.1. Advanced Encryption Standard. The AES algorithm is
a symmetric block cipher that processes data blocks of
128 bits using cipher keys of three different lengths: 128, 192,
or 256 bits. Its operations are performed on the State. The
State is a two-dimensional array of bytes which contains the
Plaintext, consisting of four rows and 𝑁𝑏 columns, where 𝑁𝑏
is the block length divided by 32. Similarly, the Key Schedule
is a two-dimensional array of bytes which contains the Key.

At the start of the cipher operation, input Plaintext is
copied to the State and input Key is copied to the Key
Schedule. After an initial Round Key addition, the State is
transformed by a Round Function implemented 𝑁𝑟 times.
This number depends on the key length: 𝑁𝑟 = 10 for 128 bits,
𝑁𝑟 = 12 for 192 bits, and 𝑁𝑟 = 14 for a key length of 256 bits.
Figure 1 shows the two main components of AES. Key
Expander and Round Function have four basic byte-oriented
transformations each, which are applied to the Key Schedule
and the State, respectively.
2.2. Vulnerability of Synchronous AES Hardware Design.
Cryptographic algorithms including AES have been used
in many applications which require high security. To satisfy these security requirements, various public/private-key
algorithms have been proposed and hardware models are
designed for encryption and decryption processes. However,
without proper hardware implementation, these algorithms
and models are still vulnerable to side-channel attacks [7–
9]. Differential power analysis (DPA) is one good example of side-channel attack where a series of power traces
is intentionally collected for a set of input Plaintexts (or
ciphertexts) and statistically analyzed to reveal the private
key or significantly narrow down the key search space [7,
8, 10, 11]. The statistical nature of DPA makes it harder to
counteract, since extremely small deviations in power can be
accumulated and amplified to locate power peaks and the
secret key can still be attacked. Even more powerful CPA
(correlation power analysis) attack has been also recently
gaining attentions [12].
Just as the power consumption of CMOS devices is datadependent, the electromagnetic radiation emanating from a
cryptosystem is also data-dependent. This data-dependent
radiation is again the origin of side-channel information
leakages. The leaked side-channel information is analyzed by
means of electromagnetic analysis (EMA), which measures
electromagnetic fields near cryptographic device [6] and uses
this data to compromise the security. But if we can curtail the
leakage of side-channel information, we can thereby make
it difficult for the attacker to have sufficient information
to identify the segments in the power waveform and EM
radiation. We can secure the cryptosystem more effectively
against these power analysis and EMA SCA.
2.3. Null Convention Logic (NCL). NCL is a delay-insensitive
(DI) logic design paradigm. The delay insensitivity of NCL
circuits is achieved by dual-rail and quad-rail logic [13]. A
dual-rail signal can effectively represent four states. Out of
them, the three valid states are DATA0, DATA1, and NULL.
The fourth state in which both rails are asserted is considered
as an illegal state. The valid data states DATA0 and DATA1
correspond to Boolean logic 0, Boolean logic 1, respectively.
The control signal NULL is used for asynchronous handshaking. The clock-free operation is implemented via the
two delay-insensitive registers located on either side of the
combinational circuit and the local handshaking signals.
The main benefit of NCL is that more uniform power consumption signature can be achieved since the signals are
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Figure 1: Block diagram of AES Round Function with Key Expander.

implemented by two complementary wires. Furthermore,
due to delay-insensitive nature, these DI circuits adhere to
monotonic transitions between DATA and NULL; so, there
is no glitching, unlike clocked Boolean circuits that produce
substantial glitch power and information leakage resulting
from glitching. DI systems better distribute switching over
time and area, reducing the switching activity, peak power
demand, and system noise, unlike clocked Boolean circuits
where much of the circuitry switches simultaneously at
the clock edge. Another important potential of NCL is it
inherently allows intentional noise injection by randomizing
timing of switching activities to further reduce the sidechannel information leakage. The downside is it generally
incurs area and wire overhead.

3. Influence of Switching Activity on SCA
3.1. Role of Switching Activity on Power Analysis SCA. The
dynamic power consumption of CMOS gates is particularly
relevant from a side-channel point of view since it determines
a simple relationship between a device’s internal data and its
externally observable power consumption. It can be written
as
2
⋅ 𝑓.
𝑃dyn = 𝐴 ⋅ 𝐶𝐿 ⋅ 𝑉dd

(1)

In (1), 𝑃dyn is the power consumed, 𝐴 is the switching
activity factor, 𝐶𝐿 is the switched capacitance, 𝑉dd is the
supply voltage, and 𝑓 is the clock frequency. This datadependent power consumption is the origin of side-channel
information leakages. If we are able to reduce the switching
activity factor 𝐴 in (1), that would directly translate to
decreased dynamic power consumption. Messerges et al.
discussed the role of SNR ratio in determining the success
probability of a DPA attack in [14]. Consider
SNR =

var (𝑃expl )
var (𝑃noise )

.

(2)

Equation (2) can be used to estimate SNR [15]. In this
equation, var(𝑃expl ) is the variance of exploitable component
of power consumption and var(𝑃noise ) is the variance of noise
component. By reducing this exploitable power information

𝑃expl , we can lower the SNR ratio. The lower the SNR ratio, the
lower the leakage; so, performing the power analysis attack
becomes harder.
3.2. Role of Switching Activity on EM SCA. The switching
activity also influences the EM radiation leaked from the
cryptosystem. The voltage fluctuation caused by ground
bounce can be expressed as [6]
Δ𝑉 = 𝐿 eff ⋅ 𝑀 ⋅

𝑑𝐼
.
𝑑𝑡

(3)

In this equation, 𝐿 eff is the effective parasitic inductance,
𝑀 is the number of simultaneous switching outputs, and
𝑑𝐼/𝑑𝑡 is the rate of change of the current. So, it is clear that if
we are able to reduce the switching activity 𝑀, we can reduce
the information leakage due to Δ𝑉, as Δ𝑉 ∝ 𝑀.

4. NCL AES Key Expander Design
The AES algorithm uses a Key Expander to calculate the
Round Keys used in AddRoundKey stage of the Round
Function. The AES specification refers to this process as the
KeyExpansion. The motive behind the purpose of this unit is
that generating multiple keys from an initial key and using a
unique key for each round, instead of using the same key for
all the rounds, greatly increase the diffusion of bits. For this
research, we chose AES with a key size of 128 bits.
The control unit for these NCL AES Key Expander and
Round Function is shown in Figure 2. In this control unit,
the input data which is in ordinary binary format is read and
is converted into dual-rail inputs by single-rail to dual-rail
converter. 𝐾𝑜 is the output acknowledgement signal coming
out of the NCL Round function and Key Expander. It acts like
clock signal for the other units in the controller. The converter
and multiplexer (MUX) are controlled by 𝐾𝑜 . When 𝐾𝑜 is 1,
it means NCL Round function and Key expander are ready
for NULL wavefront; then, MUX will send all 0’s to Plaintext
and Input Key to nullify the NCL Key Expander and Round
function. Otherwise, MUX will select the dual-rail data that
is output from the converter. The dual-rail “Input Key” is fed
as input to the NCL Key Expander and it generates the Round
Keys necessary for each encryption round of AES.
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Figure 2: Block diagram of NCL AES control unit.

The block diagram of the Key Expander architecture
[16] is presented in Figure 3. The 𝑤0 , 𝑤1 , 𝑤2 , and 𝑤3 are
the four columns of the Key Schedule. The columns of the
Key Schedule which have their index as a multiple of four
undergo the “RSX step” along with the XOR operation; all the
remaining columns undergo XOR operations to generate the
Round Key. As depicted in the figure, Key Expander consists
of the following modules.
RotateWord. This operation accepts an array of 4 bytes and
rotates them 1 position to the left. The RotWord function used
by KeyExpansion is very similar to the ShiftRows routine
used by the encryption algorithm except that it works on a
single column of the Key Schedule, instead of the rows of the
State array.
SubWord. The SubWord routine performs a byte-by-byte
substitution on a given row of the Key Schedule table using
the NCL S-box. The substitutions in KeyExpansion operate
exactly like those in the SubBytes step of Round Function.
The input byte to be substituted is fed as input to the
NCL combinational S-box, and this input then undergoes
multiplicative inversion in GF(28 ) and affine transformation
during encryption. We employed the dual-rail combinational
NCL S-box proposed in [4] for this step as this design already
proved to be very power efficient and resistant to SCA. The
architecture of the S-box and the block diagram of its internal
multiplicative inversion module are presented in Figures 4
and 5.
Round Constant Module. This module uses an array Rcon,
called the round constant table. In the synchronous implementation, these round constants are 4 bytes each to match
with a column of the Key Schedule table. The AES KeyExpansion routine [1] requires 10 round constants, one for

w0 w1 w2 w3

RSX
+

+

+

+

w4 w5 w6 w7

RotateWord
RSX

SubWord

RSX
+

+

w8

w9 w10 w11

+

+

Round constant

XOR

Figure 3: Block diagram of AES Key Expander [16].

each round of the AES algorithm. In our implementation, we
implement this as an array of round constants represented in
dual-rail notation.
XOR Module. In this module, we perform the XOR operation
between the columns of the Key Schedule with or without the
round constant selected in previous step depending on the
column which is being calculated. In order to realize this XOR
function in NCL, we have to make use of NCL XOR function
designed using the NCL threshold gates.
Unlike Boolean logic, NCL has 27 fundamental threshold
gates to realize arbitrary logic [13]. In order to achieve
the input-completeness and observability, it is important to
choose appropriate threshold gates. For the design of NCL
XOR function, the sum-of-product (SOP) expressions are
𝑍1 = 𝐴1 𝐵0 +𝐴0 𝐵1 and 𝑍0 = 𝐴0 𝐵0 +𝐴1 𝐵1 . They can be realized
by mapping them to THxor0 gates as shown in Figure 6.
However, two transistors can be eliminated for each rail of 𝑍
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a−1

(when using static gates) by realizing this same functionality
using TH24comp gates. This is done by adding the two do not
care terms, representing the cases when both rails of either 𝐴
or 𝐵 are simultaneously asserted.
The new equations are 𝑍1 = 𝐴1 𝐵0 + 𝐴0 𝐵1 + 𝐴0 𝐴1 + 𝐵0 𝐵1
and 𝑍0 = 𝐴0 𝐵0 + 𝐴1 𝐵1 + 𝐴0 𝐴1 + 𝐵0 𝐵1 . The NCL XOR
function realized using these equations and TH24comp gates
is presented in Figure 7 and is used in our proposed design.
This TH24comp based XOR offers a 10% reduction in the
number of transistors required compared to the approach
using THxor0 gates.

Figure 5: Block diagram of multiplicative inversion over GF(28 )
where MM is modular multiplication unit.

A1

A0

B1

B0

THxor0

Z1

THxor0

Z0

5. NCL AES Round Function
The top-level architecture of the proposed NCL AES Round
Function design is presented in Figure 8. Controller for this
module is presented previously in Figure 2. This control unit
takes care of converting the ordinary Plaintext and Input Key
into dual-rail notations. The dual-rail “Input Key” is fed
as input to the NCL Key Expander and it generates the
Round Key, which along with the dual-rail Plaintext from the
controller is fed to the AES Round Function.
The NCL AES Round Function consists of the following
four steps which are performed sequentially.
(1) NCL SubBytes. In this transformation, each dual-rail byte
of the State matrix is substituted independently by another

Figure 6: NCL XOR function using THxor gates.

6

Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering

A1

A0

B1

B0

TH24comp

Z1

TH24comp

Z0

Figure 7: NCL XOR function using TH24comp gates.

one which is computed by the NCL S-box. The S-box is a key
element in the AES architecture as it significantly influences
the security, power consumption, and throughput of the AES
hardware. We are using the dual-rail combinational NCL Sbox proposed in [4] for this step as this design already proved
to be very power efficient and resistant to SCA.
(2) NCL ShiftRows. The NCL ShiftRow transformation function performs byte transposition of all dual-rail NCL signals
by using circular shifting, where each row of dual-rail State is
rotated cyclically to left using 0-, 1-, 2-, and 3-byte offsets for
encryption.
(3) NCL MixColumns. In this transformation, each column
of the dual-rail State matrix is multiplied by a circulant maximum distance separable matrix. This MixColumns function
takes four dual-rail bytes as inputs and four dual-rail bytes as
outputs, where each input byte affects all four output bytes.
The multiplication of the State array element with 2 in the
dual-rail domain is realized by 1-bit left shift of dual-rail
signals followed by a conditional NCL XOR operation. The
multiplication with 3 is implemented in a similar fashion but
it involves an additional NCL XOR operation.
(4) NCL AddRoundKey. AddRoundKey transformation performs a byte level dual-rail XOR operation on the dual-rail
output of MixColumn and corresponding dual-rail Round
Key.

6. Spatial Temporal Random Dynamic
Voltage Scaling (STRDVS) Augmentation
of NCL AES for Higher SCA Resistance
Recently, Yang et al. [17] applied random dynamic voltage and
frequency scaling (RDVFS) to synchronous cryptoprocessors

to enhance resistance against side-channel attacks. By randomly changing the supply voltage, “noise” can be injected
into the power trace, making the attack more difficult.
The clock frequency changes with different supply voltages
to avoid timing violation. However, since the circuits are
synchronous, the change in clock frequency can be easily
observed in the power trace and, using certain hypothesis, the
voltage corresponding to the frequency can also be obtained.
As such, the attack can still be successful. To alleviate the
problem, [18] proposes to use random DVS (RDVS) only,
without changing the clock frequency. However, the tight
timing constraint gives little room to do the voltage scaling.
It is obvious that the security enhancement highly
depends on how much “noise” can be injected; this in turn
depends on how much room is available for the voltage
scaling. We argue that RDVS is more suitable for QDI designs
for two reasons. First, there will be no timing constraint as
in the synchronous or bounded-delay counterparts, leaving
more room for voltage scaling. Second, since there is no clock
signal, fewer gates will switch simultaneously and thus the
power supply noise is reduced. Accordingly, the noise margin
is increased, providing even more room for voltage scaling.
Different from [17, 18], in addition to changing the
supply voltage randomly over time (temporal randomness),
we propose to supply different random voltages over different
regions in the chip (spatial randomness). Since NCL is selftimed and event-driven, difference in latencies among the
regions caused by STRDVS is inherently tolerated unlike
the clocked counterpart. Such spatial and temporal RDVS
(STRDVS) in NCL will maximize the noise injected and thus
the resistance to side-channel attacks.
Spatial and temporal random dynamic voltage scaling
(STRDVS) is especially suitable for delay-insensitive designs
to provide additional resistance to side-channel attack and to
further reduce the power consumption as a byproduct [19].
The reason for QDI circuits to still have vulnerabilities is the
imbalanced load capacitances between the two rails of a signal. Although the total number of switching is independent of
data pattern, the switching activities between the two rails are
different. For example, passing consecutive DATA1s makes
Rail1 switch all the time, while passing consecutive DATA0s
makes Rail0 switch all the time. Since most likely the two
rails drive different loads, power is still imbalanced across
data patterns and is still coupled with data being processed. A
number of literature proposed various techniques to mitigate
this problem.
6.1. Leveraging TRNG for the Proposed STRDVS NCL Cryptohardware. TRNG (true random number generator) is widely
used for designing hardware systems for secure applications
such as secure wireless communications, electronic financial
transactions, smart cards, mobile computing, and secure
RFID. Unlike PRNG (pseudorandom number generator)
which always gives the same number sequence for a particular
seed state (i.e., thereby less secure), TRNG are based on
microscopic phenomena that generate a low-level, statistically random “noise” signal with high information entropy
[20], such as thermal noise, oscillator drift, the photoelectric
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effect, or other quantum phenomena [21]. There exist various TRNG designs for hardware implementation purposes
including ones that are reported in [22–30]. One good
example is TRNG1 IP (intellectual property) core by IP Cores,
Inc [31]. TRNG1 features a high entropy source (i.e., either
128 or 256 bits) and satisfies Federal Information Processing
Standard (FIPS) Publication 140-2 Annex C (i.e., “approved”
random number generator) from the US National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) [32] and passes the
requirements of the NIST SP 800-22 test suite [33].
The proposed NCL AES components leverage a TRNG for
the proposed STRDVS technique for even higher resistance
over SCA by intentionally injecting noise. Since TRNG
already exists in most secure HW systems, it is not an
overhead to the proposed design.
6.2. Spatial/Temporal Randomness & Granularity of STRDVS.
The entire circuit is divided into several regions, and different
randomly generated voltage control signals from TRNG are
supplied to dynamically scale the voltage level in each region.
Since NCL is asynchronous and event-driven, difference in
latencies among the regions caused by STRDVS is inherently
tolerated unlike the clocked counterpart. For example, suppose the entire circuit is divided into 56 voltage regions with
eight dynamically scaling voltage levels. Then, each region
will need a 3-bit randomly-generated voltage control signal.
Accordingly, the 8-bit random number generator can yield
𝐶38 = 56 different random control signals for 56 regions. As
such, the temporal randomness can be achieved.
Figure 9 shows a gated signal from TRNG controlling
the supply voltage of a STRDVS region as an example. In
order for STRDVS to enhance side-channel attack resistance,
the power difference due to the change in supply voltage
(i.e., for the same input bit) must be comparable with the
power difference due to the change in input bit (i.e., for
the same supply voltage). As such, the correlation between
the input data and the power consumption is substantially
reduced. Thereby, the difference in power traces can hardly be
used to identify input switching. However, scaling down the
voltage has a direct impact on the latency of the processor.
Accordingly, the lowest possible voltage that can keep the
latency of our NCL processor within the tolerable bound
should be determined at design time.

With that determined, we still need to determine two
critical parameters: the number of voltage levels 𝐾 (i.e., temporal granularity) and the number of voltage domains 𝐿 (i.e.,
regions with different supply voltages, spatial granularity).
Larger 𝐾 and 𝐿 can result in increased security as more
noise is injected into the power trace; on the other hand,
they may also increase the area and design complexity. As a
future work, we will investigate the tradeoffs between area,
power, latency, and security and find out the optimal setting
of the parameters. In addition, a natural property of our
STRDVS method is that the level of security is related to
the encryption/decryption data rate: a high data rate gives
little room to perform voltage scaling and thus little room to
improve the security. It will also be interesting to see a tradeoff
curve between the encryption/decryption data rate and the
level of security.

7. Experimental Verification of
the Proposed Design
7.1. Functional Verification of the Proposed Design. The conventional synchronous implementation and the proposed
NCL AES Key Expander and NCL AES Round Function have
been implemented in VHDL for a comparative study. The
functional verification simulations of these designs have been
performed with Mentor Graphics ModelSim. The proposed
designs have been functionally verified completely using a
large set of test vectors from [1]. A sample set of test vectors
is presented in Figure 10 and the corresponding functional
verification results are presented in Figures 11, 12, and 13.
7.2. Weighted Average Simultaneous Switching Output
(WASSO) Analysis. WASSO tool is an utility of Xilinx PlanAhead suite that validates signal integrity of the device based
on the I/O pin and bank assignments made in the design.
This analysis gives a measure of the amount of simultaneous switching occurring in the design. So, we used this analysis to determine the variation in switching activity across
both AES Round Function designs. The results obtained
were plotted and presented in Figure 14. The implementation
platform chosen for carrying out WASSO analysis is Xilinx
Virtex-5 FPGA. As switching activity directly depends on
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Figure 10: A set of sample AES test vectors used for Figures 11∼13.

the number of simultaneously switching outputs, switching
activity can be reduced if SNR gets reduced.
From Figures 14(a) and 14(b), it can be observed that
the switching activity in the proposed design is lessened to
a considerable extent and is also more uniform as compared
to its synchronous counterpart. This reduction decreases
the amount of unintentionally leaked information and the
uniformity makes it more difficult to exploit the remaining
leaked information to carry out SCAs.
7.3. Effects of Switching Activity on Signal-to-Noise Ratio.
According to (2), it is clear that SNR is directly proportional
to var(𝑃expl ). The 𝑃expl is a combination of two quantities:
𝑃oprn and 𝑃data . But var(𝑃oprn ) is zero as we are considering
a DPA attack, in which we perform the same operation

Figure 11: Functional verification result for synchronous design.

again and again but with different input data. So, var(𝑃expl )
becomes equal to var(𝑃data ). The 𝑃data is data-dependent and is
a function of switching activity. So, the reduction of switching
activity observed from WASSO simulations will translate
into reduction of 𝑃data of all the points on the power trace.
This overall reduction of 𝑃data will translate into reduction of
var(𝑃expl ) and consequently reduction of SNR.
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Figure 12: Functional verification result for the proposed NCL
based Key Expander design.

Figure 13: Functional verification result for the proposed NCL
based Round Function design.

Additionally, as discussed previously, power consumption of a cryptosystem is heavily dependant on Hamming
weight of data it processes. Due to this, equal Hamming
weights of all inputs in our proposed design will enable our
NCL design to maintain a uniform power consumption and
thereby a uniform SNR on power trace. Thus, the proposed
design enables the cryptosystem to have a reduced and
uniform SNR, which is a key element for enhancing security.
By using the switching activity results, we performed
parametric simulations and plotted SNR of NCL design in
comparison to the synchronous approach. These approximate
results are presented in Figure 15(a). Using this SNR data,
Figure 15(b) shows how variation in SNR influences number
of traces that an attacker must collect to perform a successful
DPA attack. As SNR ratio decreases, performance of this NCL
based approach keeps getting better. So, this is the advantage
of employing NCL for cryptosystem design.
7.4. Power Benefits. In AES implementations, the SubBytes
transformation which entirely depends on the S-box is the
most crucial factor deciding the energy performance of the
AES itself. More than 50% of entire power is dependent on
this step [34–36]. Due to the use of novel NCL S-box design,
we achieve a 22% reduction in power consumption [4] at
this SubBytes step. So, this reduction will cause significant
improvement in the energy efficiency of the proposed NCL
based design approach.
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7.5. Hardware Implementation and Power Trace Analysis.
In the previous section, the performance of our proposed
design was evaluated using software simulations. However,
to get a more accurate performance analysis, simulations
on the hardware implementation are necessary. In this section, we discuss in detail the procedure used for hardware
implementation experiment of the proposed design and the
synchronous AES. Additionally, we present the power trace
data obtained from the power measurements on the hardware
implementations and discuss the variations between this
obtained data for the two designs. Figure 16 shows the
side-channel attack standard evaluation board (SASEBOGII board) [37] that is used as the basic platform in this
experiment.
The reason for choosing this FPGA board as a platform
for hardware implementation is that this board has been
specifically designed for security evaluation of cryptographic
circuits and for the purpose of side-channel attack experiments. There are two FPGA cores in this board that can be
utilized. The first FPGA is a cryptographic FPGA which is a
Xilinx Virtex-5 series FPGA. The second one is the control
FPGA which is a Spartan-3A series FPGA. These FPGAs are
connected through a general-purpose input/output common
bus. The AES Round Function and Key Expander circuits are
implemented in the cryptographic FPGA and the configuration circuit is programmed into the configuration FPGA.
The purpose of separating these two circuits is to prevent
the power trace of the configuration circuit from interfering
with the power trace of the cryptographic circuit so that the
measurements of power traces, which decide the resistance of
the design to power analysis attacks, can be done fairly.
For the purpose of power trace measurement, shunt
resistors are present on FPGA board which utilize core
𝑉DD and/or ground lines of cryptographic FPGA to give an
accurate measurement of the cryptographic FPGA power
consumption. These measurements can be captured by an
oscilloscope via a voltage probe.
Figure 17 presents the experimental setup used for power
trace analysis. For making a qualitative comparison, in terms
of security, between the quality of power traces of the
conventional design and the proposed NCL design, we supply
a set of three inputs to both designs. As the same inputs
are applied to both designs, this enables us to evaluate the
performance of different circuits to the same input data.
If we are able to prove that the following two features
of the power trace are true for NCL based design, then we
can conclude that the proposed approach enhances security.
They are as follows. (1) The power trace is more uniform
compared to synchronous design for the same input; and (2)
the power trace of NCL based approach exhibits a higher
degree of similarity between all the three different input
cases as compared to the similarity exhibited by synchronous
approach.
So, in order to perform a qualitative comparison, we
applied a series of three Plaintexts, which are shown in
Figure 18, to both cryptosystem designs and encrypted it with
the same key. Then, we recorded the power traces for each
of these cases for both designs and compared their quality in
terms of security. The results are presented in Figures 19 to 24.
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Figure 15: Comparison of SNR and difficulty of performing successful DPA for both designs.

From Figures 20, 22, and 24, we can clearly see that the
power waveforms look considerably similar for the proposed
design in all the three cases even when the input Plaintext
is different. But on the contrary for synchronous design,
from Figures 19, 21, and 23, we can see that the power trace
has clear variations between the three cases, as represented
by ovals. These variations as discussed previously can be
effectively exploited to compromise security. But, in case of
proposed design, we do not see any clear variations between
the three traces. In addition to the lack of these variations

in the proposed design, we can also see that the waveforms
are far more uniform as compared to their synchronous
counterparts.
So, with this increased uniformity and with high degree
of similarity between power traces for different Plaintexts,
we can conclude that security is improved to a considerable
extent due to inherent benefits of NCL.
Figure 25 shows the power trace corresponding to NULLDATA wavefronts in the hardware implemented design.
Figure 26 presents the propagation delay in the hardware
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Figure 20: Power trace of asynchronous cryptosystem for
Plaintext 1 (DATA).

Figure 16: Side-channel attack standard evaluation FPGA board
(SASEBO-GII).

Figure 21: Power trace of synchronous cryptosystem for Plaintext 2.

Figure 22: Power race of asynchronous cryptosystem for Plaintext 2
(DATA).

Figure 17: Experimental setup for power trace measurement.

Plaintext 1
Plaintext 2
Plaintext 3
Key

3243F6A8885A308d313198A2E0370734
3243F6A8885A308d313198A2E0370735
3243F6A8885A308d313198A2E0370736
2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C

Figure 18: Plaintexts and Key used for power trace analysis.
Figure 23: Power trace of synchronous cryptosystem for Plaintext 3.

Figure 19: Power trace of synchronous cryptosystem for Plaintext 1.

Figure 24: Power trace of asynchronous cryptosystem for
Plaintext 3 (DATA).
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approach and its augmentation with STRDVS technique will
be evaluated by performing an actual side-channel attack like
the DPA or correlation power analysis (CPA).
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